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AMERICAN SERVICEMEMBERS' PROTECTION ACT OF
2002
On July 1, 2002, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
("ICC") entered into force, establishing the first permanent international
criminal tribunal.' Although seventy-six countries had ratified the Rome
Statute by that date, the United States was not among them.2 Instead,
Congress responded to the creation of the ICC by passing a bill sponsored
by House Majority Whip Tom DeLay (R-Tex.) that Republican legislators
had been trying to get through the House and Senate for several years.3 On
August 2, 2002, the American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002
("ASPA") became law.4 The Act was designed to prevent United States
participation in the ICC and to discourage other members of the interna-
tional community from participating in the Court or assisting it in any way.5
Even before the bill's passage, commentators, diplomats, and legis-
lators had debated whether ASPA was a beneficial new tool of American
diplomacy or a coercive element of American policy that could ultimately
harm United States interests. Arguments on behalf of the Act focus on
concerns about the ICC, which its detractors view as an illegitimate in-
ternational body that could target American citizens for prosecution based
on political motives and deprive them of their constitutional rights.6 Critics
of ASPA counter that these fears are unfounded and that the ICC's founding
statute protects against any such outcome.7 They also argue from a nor-
mative standpoint that, as the first permanent international tribunal with
jurisdiction over the gravest international crimes, the ICC is a positive
development in international law that the United States ought to support.'
Once ASPA became law, these debates continued even as the Bush Ad-
ministration used ASPA as a tool to compel other nations to join America
in its opposition to the international tribunal.9
I Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9th (2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. See also U.N., 18 STATUS OF MULTI-
LATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH SECRETARY-GENERAL 10, at http://untreaty.un.org/
ENGLISHIbible/englishinternetbible/partllchapterXVlll/treaty 10.asp (last visited Apr. 5,
2003).
2 See Julia Preston, U.S. Rift With Allies on World Court Widens, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10,
2002, at A6.
I See infra text accompanying notes 49-62.
4 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from and Response to
Terrorist Attacks on the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-206, §§ 2001-2015, 116 Stat. 820,
899-909 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7421-7432). ASPA was passed as Title II of this
legislation. See id. §§ 2001-2015.
1 See generally id.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 85-126.
7 See infra text accompanying notes 85-126.
1 See infra text accompanying notes 127-135.
9 See infra text accompanying notes 136-138.
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The vehement opposition expressed by ASPA appears to run counter
to the current goals of United States foreign policy. 0 With America in-
creasing its involvements overseas in the wake of September 11, 2001,"1 a
bill that redefines military aid and antagonizes potential future allies is
not in America's national interest. While most commentators admit that
the ICC is far from perfect, ASPA seems to go to extreme and unneces-
sary lengths to assert American opposition to the court.
The Rome Statute that created the ICC was drafted at the Rome
Diplomatic Conference of 1998.2 After negotiations involving delega-
tions from 160 countries and 250 non-governmental organizations, 3 the
final vote on July 17, 1998 counted 120 countries voting for the Rome
Statute, seven voting against it, and twenty-one abstentions. 4 The seven
countries opposed to the Statute were Libya, Israel, Qatar, Yemen, Alge-
ria, China, and the United States. 5 Almost all of the United States' tradi-
tional allies, 6 including all fifteen members of the European Union ("EU")
and three of the five permanent members of the United Nations ("U.N.")
Security Council, voted for the Statute."
The Rome Statute established the ICC, which is composed of the
following units:" the Presidency; 9 three Divisions (Appeals, Trial, and
0 See infra text accompanying notes 145-148.
" These involvements include military engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well
as coordinated efforts with other countries as part of the Bush Administration's "War on
Terror." See, e.g., Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States
Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1347 (Sept.
20, 2001) ("Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there.").
12 The creation of the ICC marks the culmination of a move toward international criminal
justice that began after World War II. Four international criminal courts preceded the ICC:
the tribunals established after World War II in Tokyo and Nuremberg, and the International
Criminal Tribunals established in Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s. See generally John
E. Noyes, Panel Discussion: Association of American Law Schools Panel on the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 223, 224-25 (1999) (placing the ICC in a
historical context). The jurisprudence of these courts helped to establish the idea of indi-
vidual responsibility for crimes such as genocide, and the ICC follows in this tradition by
focusing entirely on individual criminal responsibility. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art.
24. The ICC differs from these predecessors in two key respects. First, whereas previous
tribunals had geographically limited jurisdictions, the ICC is global in its scope. See Noyes,
supra, at 225. Second, the ICC is a permanent court as opposed to an ad hoc tribunal of
limited tenure. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 1.
13 Leila Sadat Wexler, Panel Discussion: Association of American Law Schools Panel
on the International Criminal Court, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 223, 242 (2002).
14 See 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from and Response
to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-206, § 2002, 116 Stat. 820, 900
(to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7421) (listing voting history).
"s See Wexler, supra note 13, at 243. This grouping is striking given that the six coun-
tries joining the United States have been widely criticized for their human rights records.
16 "Traditional allies" here refers to fellow members of the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization, as well as countries perceived as sharing United States support for international
jus cogens.
11 See Wexler, supra note 13, at 243.
18 See Rome Statute, supra note I, art. 34.
19 Id. art. 38. The Presidency is made up of the President and First and Second Vice-
Presidents, and it is primarily responsible for the "proper administration of the Court, with
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Pre-Trial); 21 the Office of the Prosecutor; 2' the Registry; 22 and an Assem-
bly of States Parties made up of all member states. 23 The seat of the Court
is at the Hague.24
Under the Rome Statute, the ICC has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.25 This jurisdic-
tion is based on the principles of nationality and territoriality 26 and can be
exercised when either a state party or the U.N. Security Council refers a
crime to the Prosecutor, or when the Prosecutor initiates an investigation
proprio motu (on the Prosecutor's own initiative). The Rome Statute
nevertheless severely limits the Court's jurisdiction by holding it to the
principle of complementarity, which does not permit the ICC to hear a
case that has been, or is being, investigated or prosecuted by a state with
jurisdiction over it.2" The ICC can therefore only rule on cases that the state
in whose jurisdiction they fall has chosen not to pursue.
the exception of the Office of the Prosecutor." Id.
2 ld. art. 39. The Pre-Trial and Trial Divisions are each composed of at least six judges,
most of whom must have criminal trial experience. Id. The Appeals Division is composed
of the President and four other judges. Id. These Divisions in turn make up the Chambers,
which are responsible for the Court's judicial functions. Id. The Appeals Chambers is
composed of all the judges in the Appeals Division, while the Pre-Trial and Trial Cham-
bers are each composed of three of their respective judges (although the Pre-Trial Chamber
can be composed of only one Pre-Trial Division judge in certain circumstances). Id.
21 Id. art. 42. The Office of the Prosecutor is made up of the Prosecutor; Deputy Prose-
cutors, who must be of different nationalities than the Prosecutor; and advisers appointed
by the Prosecutor with legal experience on specific issues. Id. The Prosecutor, who is en-
tirely independent of the other organs of the Court, is responsible for initiating and pursu-
ing investigations and charging suspects. Id. arts. 42, 53, 61.
22 Id. art. 43. The Registry, made up of the Registrar and Deputy Registrar, is "respon-
sible for the non-judicial aspects of the administration and servicing of the Court" and the
maintenance of a Victims and Witnesses Unit. Id.
23 See id. art. 112; infra text accompanying notes 32-35.
24 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 3.
25 Id. art. 5.
26 See id. art. 12. The Court has jurisdiction when a state party (or a non-party state
that has accepted the Court's jurisdiction) is either "the State on the territory of which the
conduct in question occurred" or "the State of which the person accused of the crime is a
national." Id. art. 12(2). While this means that territorial jurisdiction can be extended over
the citizens of a non-party state, this is not universal jurisdiction, which was explicitly
rejected at the Rome Conference. See Ambassador David Scheffer, International Criminal
Court: The Challenge of Jurisdiction, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American
Society of International Law (Mar. 26, 1999) (stating that Article Twelve "is not an article
that grants the Court universal jurisdiction over the list of crimes in Article [Five]" because
"[a] proposal to that effect was defeated at Rome"), available at http://www.iccnow.org/
documents/otherissues/DavidSchefferAddressOnlCC.doc. This jurisdiction can extend to
the heads of state of non-party states. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 27.
27 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 13, 15. The Prosecutor's power to initiate in-
vestigations or prosecutions is limited, however. The Prosecutor first requires the authori-
zation of the Pre-Trial Chamber to go forward with an investigation or prosecution. See id.
art. 15. This in turn requires the Prosecutor to notify all state parties and all states that
would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned. See id. art. 18. The Prose-
cutor's independence is further limited by the provision that the U.N. Security Council can
defer investigation or prosecution. See id. art. 16.
28 See id. art. 17. The only exception to this principle is that the ICC can exercise ju-
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The three Divisions of the ICC are made up of a total of eighteen
judges, each of whom must be a national of a state party.29 Judgeships on
the Court are full-time positions, and judges are expected to be inde-
pendent and impartial; the Rome Statute includes provisions for the dis-
qualification of biased judges. 0 The Prosecutor is a separate organ of the
Court, independent of the judges and all other organs.3 Above these or-
gans lies the Assembly of States Parties, which is made up of one repre-
sentative from each state party.3 This group oversees the administration
of the Court, decides the Court's budget, determines the number of judges,
and generally shapes the ICC as a whole.33 After July 1, 2009, this As-
sembly may also consider amendments to the Rome Statute,34 including
proposals for a definition of the currently undefined crime of aggression.35
risdiction over a case if the state that would otherwise be able to prosecute the case "is
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution." Id. art.
17(l)(a). The Rome Statute defines "unwillingness" as when a state initiates proceedings
for the purpose of shielding a person, engages in unjustified delay, or conducts proceedings
that are not independent and impartial. Id. art. 17(2). It defines "inability" as when a state
is unable to carry out its proceedings "due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailabil-
ity of its national judicial system." Id. art. 17(3).
29 See id. art. 36. These judges both decide the cases before the court and vote for the
President and First and Second Vice-Presidents. See id. art. 38.
30 See id. arts. 40-41. Impartiality is defined as judges "not engag[ing] in any activity
which is likely to interfere with their judicial functions or to affect confidence in their
independence." Id. art. 40(2). The disqualification of a judge is determined by an absolute
majority of the Court's other judges. See id. art. 41(2)(c).
"' See id. art. 42.
32 See id. art. 112. The Assembly also consists of a Bureau of a President, two Vice-
Presidents, and eighteen elected members. Id. Each state party has one vote. Id. State par-
ties that are significantly in arrears in their required financial contribution to the Court may
not vote, nor may observers vote. Id. The Assembly may establish necessary subsidiary
bodies such as an independent oversight mechanism. Id.33 See id. art. 112.
34 See id. art. 121. After this date, amendments may be proposed by any state party. Id.
The Assembly then votes on amendments, which require a two-thirds majority to pass. Id.
Upon passage, amendments enter into force for all state parties one year after ratification.
Id. Amendments regarding the crimes under the Court's jurisdiction, however, only enter
into force for those state parties that have agreed to them. Id.
35 See id. art. 5(2) (foreseeing the definition of the crime of aggression under Article
121). Before the Rome Statute entered into force, countries were already proposing various
definitions of the crime of aggression. See, e.g., Preparatory Commission for the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/1999/INF/2 (1999) (compiling the proposed
definitions of aggression before the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal
Court). Once the Court came into existence, the Assembly of States Parties began accept-
ing proposals for definitions of the crime of aggression to be considered after July 1, 2009.
See Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/1/L.4
(2003). Cuba proposed the following definition for the crime of aggression:
an act committed by a person who, being in the position of effectively controlling
or directing the political, economic or military actions of a State, orders, permits
or participates actively in the planning, preparation, initiation or execution of an
act that directly or indirectly affects the sovereignty, the territorial integrity or the
political or economic independence of another States, in a manner inconsistent
with the Charter of the United Nations.
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Since the ICC depends on international cooperation at all points during
a case to ensure the just adjudication of a trial, the Rome Statute specifies
provisions for requests for cooperation sent out by the Court. 36 Although
state parties are generally required to comply with such requests, the Rome
Statute provides for certain exceptions. If the disclosure of information
or documents would threaten national security, for example, the Statute
does not require disclosure. 37 Also, if requests for cooperation would re-
quire a state party either to act inconsistently with respect to the immu-
nity of the person or property of a third state or to violate an agreement
requiring a third state's consent for cooperation, Article 98 of the Rome
Statute frees the state party from cooperating with the court. 38
Once a case has reached the trial level, the Rome Statute provides
for many procedural due process protections;39 these do not include a
right to a jury trial.4" A criminal convicted by the ICC can be fined4 or
sentenced to imprisonment, including life imprisonment for crimes of
Id.
36 See id. art. 87. If state parties do not comply with such requests, the Court may refer
the matter to the Assembly of States Parties, or to the Security Council if the Security
Council referred the matter to the Court. See id. art. 87(7). The Court may also make re-
quests to a non-party state if this state has entered into an ad hoc agreement with the Court.
See id. art. 87(5). Such requests for cooperation can relate to the arrest and surrender of a
person or other forms of cooperation such as the provision of documents, the protection of
victims and witnesses, and the taking of evidence. See id. arts. 89-93.
31 See id. art. 72. While the threat to national security is to be determined by the state
itself, the Rome Statute calls for the ICC to request further consultations to determine the
validity of the state's concern. See id. If this fear is found to be unwarranted, and the state
is thus "not acting in accordance with its obligations" the Court may refer the matter to the
Assembly of States Parties or to the Security Council if the Security Council referred the
matter to the Court. Id.
38 See id. art. 98 (prohibiting the Court from "proceed[ing] with a request for surrender
or assistance which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obliga-
tions under international law," regarding both diplomatic immunity and agreements re-
quiring the consent of a sending state).
39 See generally id. Rights provided by the Rome Statute include: protection against
double jeopardy, id. art. 20; protection from ex post facto crimes (here referred to as "nul-
lum crimen sine lege"), id. art. 22; protection from warrantless search and seizure, id. arts.
57(3)(e), 58; protection against self-incrimination, id. arts. 55, 67(l)(g); right to a written
statement of charges, id. art. 61(3); protection against trials in absentia, id. arts. 63,
67(l)(d); presumption of innocence, id. art. 66; speedy and public trials, id. arts. 67(l)(a),
(c); right to counsel, id. arts. 67(1)(b), (d); right to cross-examination of witnesses at trial,
id. art. 67(l)(e); right to remain silent, id. art. 67(l)(g); and exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence, id. art. 69(7). See also Monroe Leigh, Editorial Comment, The United States and
the Statute of Rome, 95 AM. J. INT'L. L. 124, 130-31 (2001) (cataloguing the above pro-
tections).
4°See infra text accompanying notes 108-109. One of the many arguments for the
United States joining the ICC is that United States negotiators contributed to the framing
of these protections during the drafting of the Statute. See Christopher L. Blakesley, Panel
Discussion: Association of American Law Schools Panel on the International Criminal
Court, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 223, 237-38 (1999) (arguing that the United States should
take an active role in the creation of the ICC).
4, Id. art. 77.
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"extreme gravity."42 Appeals are permitted on any grounds affecting "the
fairness or reliability of the proceedings or decision."43
Although the Rome Statute creating the ICC was drafted at the Rome
Diplomatic Conference in 1998, it could not enter into force for any sig-
natories until it had been ratified by sixty countries,44 a requirement that
was met on July 1, 2002."5 On September 3, 2002, with seventy-six members
in attendance, Zeid bin Raad, Jordan's envoy to the U.N., was elected to the
Presidency, and the Court was expected to start operating in the spring of
2003.46 The United States, though arguably the strongest potential mem-
ber of the Court, remained outside the list of state participants.
47
American opposition to the ICC goes back to the Rome Diplomatic
Conference itself, when the United States delegation refused to sign the
Rome Statute because it claimed that negotiations had not produced an
institution with sufficient protections for United States interests.48 When
President Clinton eventually signed the Statute on December 31, 2000,
4 9
he qualified his position by stating, "I will not, and do not recommend
that my successor submit the Treaty to the Senate for advice and consent
until our fundamental concerns are satisfied."50 Senator Jesse Helms (R-
N.C.), Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, went even fur-
ther in his opposition to the Rome Statute, arguing that the signature of
the United States was "as outrageous as it is inexplicable," and vowing
that it "will not stand."'" Responding to this sentiment, President Bush
42 Id. art. 77. For most crimes, sentences are limited to imprisonment of thirty years or
less. See id.431 d. art. 81.
44 See id. art. 126.
45 See U.N., supra note 1.
46 See World Briefing United Nations: Criminal Court Moves Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
4, 2002, at A5; Preston, supra note 2, at A6. The Court was inaugurated on March 1I,
2003, when eighteen judges were sworn in. Ian Black, International Criminal Court Sworn
in, GUARDIAN (LONDON), Mar. 12, 2003, at 16.
41 See U.N., supra note 1.48 See Leigh, supra note 39, at 124-25. One of the Clinton Administration's primary
objections to the ICC at the time was the jurisdiction over citizens of non-party states per-
mitted under Article 12 of the Rome Statute, which the United States opposes out of the
belief that it could lead to the "unwarranted exposure of U.S. personnel to the ICC's juris-
diction." Scheffer, supra note 26. See also Barbara Crossette, U.S. Accord Being Sought on
U.N. Dues and on Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2000, at A6.
49 Michael E. Guillory, Civilianizing the Force: Is the United States Crossing the Rubi-
con?, 51 A.F. L. REV. 11I, 132 (2001). Clinton's action made the United States a signatory
to the treaty, but the United States must ratify the treaty in order to become a party. See U.N.,
supra note 1.
50 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from and Response to
Terrorist Attacks on the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-206, § 2002, 116 Stat. 820, 900 (to
be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7421).
1' Diane Marie Amann & M.N.S. Sellers, American Law in a Time of Global Interde-
pendence: U.S. National Reports to the XVIth International Congress of Comparative Law:
Section IV: The United States of America and the International Criminal Court, 50 AM. J.
COMP. L. 381, 381 (2002).
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strengthened American resistance to the ICC by retracting the signature
of the United States on the Rome Statute on May 6, 2002.52
Even prior to this retraction, congressional opponents of the ICC had
already devised numerous legislative responses to its imminent creation.
Legislators such as Representatives Ron Paul (R-Tex.) and Henry Hyde
(R-Ill.) proposed resolutions that recommended withdrawing the United
States' signature53 or offered more general recommendations for with-
holding support from the ICC.5 4 While one bill prohibiting United States
financial assistance to the ICC passed in 2001,11 most of this proposed
legislation was never voted into law.
As these legislative responses to the ICC were being debated, the
American government was simultaneously turning to forceful diplomatic
tactics to exempt itself from the reach of the ICC. After the Rome Statute
came into effect in July 2002, the United States demanded that the U.N.
Security Council grant it a renewable one-year provision for blanket im-
munity from the ICC.56 When the other members of the Council balked,
the United States threatened not to renew the mandates of two U.N. peace-
keeping missions in Bosnia and Croatia.5 On July 12, 2002, the Security
52 See 148 CONG. REC. E775 (daily ed. May 9, 2002) (statement of Rep. Paul (R-Tex.))
(applauding President Bush's renunciation).
53See, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001). House Concurrent Resolution
Twenty-Three, "[e]xpressing the sense of the Congress that President George W. Bush
should declare to all nations that the.United States does not intend to assent to or ratify the
International Criminal Court Treaty, also referred to as the Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, and the signature of former President Clinton to that treaty should
not be construed otherwise," was introduced in the House in February 2001, see 147 CONG.
REC. H254 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2001), but received no floor debate.
5See, e.g., H. Amdt. 408, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 4169, 107th Cong. (2002). House
Amendment 408, an amendment sponsored by Representative Hyde to the Department of
Defense Appropriations Act of 2002, H.R. 3338, 107th Cong. (2001), that would have
prohibited "any funding to provide support or assistance to the United Nations Interna-
tional Criminal Court or to any criminal investigation or other prosecutorial activity of the
International Criminal Court," was offered on November 28, 2001. 147 CONG. REc. H8441-03
(daily ed. Nov. 28, 2001). The amendment was agreed to in the House but not included in
the final appropriations act. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-117, 115 Stat. 2229 (2002). House Bill 4169, introduced by Representative
Paul on April 11, 2002 and forwarded to the House Committee on International Relations,
advocated the formal rescission of the United States' signature to the Rome Statute, a pro-
hibition on using United States government funds to assist the ICC, and the taking of "such
steps as are necessary to prevent the establishment of the International Criminal Court."
H.R. 4169, 107th Cong. § 3 (2002).
11 Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-77, § 624, 115 Stat. 748, 803 (to be codified
at 16 U.S.C. § 1856) ("None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this
Act shall be available for cooperation with, or assistance or other support to, the Interna-
tional Criminal Court or the Preparatory Commission"). This provision, which was added
by amendment, was sponsored by Senator Larry E. Craig (R-Id.). See S. Amdt. 1536,
107th Cong. (2001).
56 See Serge Schmemann, U.S. Peacekeepers Given Year's Immunity From New Court,
N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2002, at A3.
57 See Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 96
A.J.I.L. 706, 726 (Sean D. Murphy ed., 2002) [hereinafter Contemporary Practice].
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Council arrived at a compromise that granted a one-year exemption from
the court's jurisdiction to U.N. peacekeeping personnel from non-party
states to the ICC.58
Even as legislative responses to the Rome Statute aimed directly at
the ICC were being considered, a new breed of proposed bills developed
focusing instead on the other countries considering ratification of the Rome
Statute. In 2000, 2001, and 2002, Congress considered withholding military
aid from any country that signed on to the Court, thereby attempting to
deprive the ICC of enough members to make it effective. The first of
these bills, the American Servicemembers Protection Act of 2000, 59 was
introduced by Senator Helms on June 14, 2000 but never made it into
law.60 In 2001, both Senator Helms and Representative DeLay proposed
new versions of the American Servicemembers Protection Act,6' but,
again, neither attempt succeeded.
62
In 2002, Representative DeLay again proposed the American Service-
members Protection Act, this time as an amendment to the 2002 Supple-
58 Resolution 1422, U.N. Security Council, 4572d Mtg., S/RES/1422 (2002). This
compromise struck some members of the diplomatic community as unusual. See Schme-
mann, supra note 56, at A3 (quoting the Canadian ambassador to the U.N. as being "ex-
tremely disappointed with the outcome" and an international justice specialist at Amnesty
International who viewed the compromise as "an unlawful Security Council resolution").
Nevertheless, this was not the first time a country had negotiated immunity from the ICC.
In 1998, even before the Court came into effect, France used a provision of the Rome Stat-
ute to arrange for immunity for its soldiers on U.N. peacekeeping missions for seven years.
See U.N., supra note 1. Article 124 permits parties to the ICC not to accept the Court's
jurisdiction for war crimes for seven years after the Rome Statute enters into force for
those states. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 124. See also John Tagliabue, More Na-
tions Said to Back World Court Exemptions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2002, § 1, at 16. The
French compromise was based on an agreement to ratify the Rome Statute in the future.
See Crossette, supra note 48, at A6. The American agreement, by contrast, was based on a
threat to block future U.N. peacekeeping missions. See Contemporary Practice, supra note
57, at 726.
19 S. 2726, 106th Cong. (2000).
60 Leigh, supra note 39, at 130. The 2000 version of the American Servicemembers
Protection Act, which was sent to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, prohibited
any cooperation either with the ICC, see S. 2726, 106th Cong. § 4 (2000), or with U.N.
peacekeeping missions that would put United States military personnel at risk of ICC
prosecution, see id. § 5; prohibited transfer of national security information to the ICC, see
id. § 6; forbade military assistance to ICC state parties (except allies), see id. § 7; and per-
mitted the United States to free "persons held captive by or on behalf of the International
Criminal Court," id. § 8.
61 See S. Amdt. 1690 to National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, S.
1438, 107th Cong. (2001); H. Amdt. 31 to Foreign Relations Authorization Act, H.R.
1646, 107th Cong. (2002).
62 See Respect for a World Court, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 21, 2001, at A22; Adam
Clymer, House Panel Approves Measures to Oppose New Global Court, N.Y. TIMES, May
11, 2002, at A3. Senator Helms' proposal for the American Servicemembers Protection
Act of 2001 passed both houses of Congress but was then removed in conference before
final passage into law. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-107, 115 Stat. 1011 (2002). The DeLay amendment was agreed to in the
House, but was not included in the final bill. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, 116 Stat. 1349 (2002).
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mental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery From and Response to
Terrorist Attacks on the United States.63 On August 2, 2002, the appro-
priations bill became law, and, in Title II of the Act, after two years of
trying, Congress had finally passed ASPA. 4 Only one month after the ICC
came into being, the United States had passed a strong legislative re-
sponse.
Following the lead of many of the earlier proposed bills, ASPA for-
bids any United States government entity from providing support for the
ICC. Specifically, this bill prohibits any such body from cooperating with
a request for cooperation from the ICC, including transmitting any letters
rogatory from the ICC, aiding in the transfer of a United States citizen or
permanent resident alien to the ICC, or assisting in the extradition of any
person to the ICC.65 Furthermore, no federal funds may be used to assist
in any actions against a United States citizen or permanent resident alien
before the Court,66 and the President must establish appropriate safe-
guards to prevent national security information from being transferred,
either directly or indirectly, to the ICC.67 In order to ensure that these
provisions are met, United States courts and government bodies may
limit their interpretation of any mutual legal assistance treaties to comply
with ASPA. 68
ASPA further expresses American opposition to the ICC by restrict-
ing American actions abroad. Members of the United States Armed Forces
are prohibited under the Act from participating in any U.N. peacekeeping
or peace enforcement operation unless such an operation permanently
63 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from and Response to
Terrorist Attacks on the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-206, §§ 2001-2015, 116 Stat. 820,
899-909 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7421-7432).
4 See id. As an amendment to an appropriations bill, the legislation went through the
Appropriations Committee rather than the International Relations Committee, which would
most likely have had a greater understanding of the foreign policy implications of both
ASPA and the ICC. See Clymer, supra note 62, at A3.
65 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act § 2004.
6 See id. § 2004(f).
67 See id. § 2006 (requiring the President to "ensure that appropriate procedures are in
place to prevent the transfer of classified national security information and law enforce-
ment information to the International Criminal Court" or a party to the ICC).
68 See id. § 2004(g) (requiring the United States to "exercise its rights to limit the use
of assistance provided under all treaties and executive agreements for mutual legal assis-
tance ... to which the United States is a party"). The President is permitted to waive Sec-
tions 2004 and 2006, and thereby permit cooperation with the ICC, if he or she determines
that the investigation or prosecution is in the United States' national interest and that the
person charged is not a current or former "covered" United States or allied person. See id.
A covered United States person is defined as a member of the United States Armed Forces,
an elected or appointed official of the United States government, or any other person em-
ployed by or working on behalf of the United States government. Id. § 2013. Covered al-
lied persons are military personnel, elected or appointed officials, and other persons em-
ployed by or working on behalf of the government of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization
("NATO") member country, a major non-NATO ally, or Taiwan as long as that government
is not a party to the ICC. Id. §§ 2003(c), 2013. See infra note 75 (listing countries defined
as major non-NATO allies).
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exempts participating Americans from any assertion of jurisdiction by the
ICC.69 For other joint command operations, where a member of the United
States Armed Forces could be under the control of allied states that are
under the jurisdiction of the ICC, ASPA requires the President to suggest
modifications to reduce the risk of Americans being subjected to this ju-
risdiction."0 Effective July 1, 2003, ASPA also forbids the United States
from granting military assistance to the government of an ICC state party.71
While this provision could theoretically end United States military aid to
dozens of countries,7 2 ASPA exempts many countries from this harsh
prohibition: waivers are permitted if the President deems assistance to be
in the national interest;73 if the country receiving assistance has signed an
Article 98 agreement preventing the country from aiding in the investi-
gation or prosecution of United States citizens and permanent resident
aliens;7 4 or if the country receiving assistance is a North Atlantic Treaty
Organization ("NATO") member country, a major non-NATO ally, or
Taiwan.75
Moreover, if any covered United States or allied person is detained
or imprisoned by the ICC, ASPA authorizes the President to use "all
means necessary and appropriate" to bring about that person's release.76
Despite the fact that this provision earned ASPA the nickname the "Hague
Invasion Act,' 7 such means are not limited to military actions but can
also include the provision of legal assistance.78
69 See id. § 2005. One exception to this provision is ASPA's grant to the President of
permission to assign forces to a U.N. mission that does not provide for such an exemption
if United States national interest would justify participation in the operation. See id.
§ 2005(c). Additionally, if the ICC enters into a binding agreement not to assert jurisdic-
tion over any current or former covered United States or allied person, ASPA permits a
waiver on its prohibition against participation in U.N. peacekeeping missions. See id.
§ 2003(a).
" See id. § 2009 (referring to all "military alliance[s] to which the United States is
party").
"' See id. § 2007. This provision is a break from many of the previous proposed bills
opposing the ICC. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
72 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 797 tbl.1293 (2001) (calculating United States economic and military aid
to foreign countries as $15.987 billion in 1999).
73 See 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act § 2007(b) (permitting the President to
waive the prohibition of military assistance "if he determines and reports to the appropriate
congressional committees that it is important to the national interest of the United States to
waive such prohibition").
74 See id. § 2007(c). See also supra note 38 and accompanying text.
71 See 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act § 2007(d). ASPA defines major non-
NATO allies to include Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Argentina, the Republic of
Korea, and New Zealand. Id.
76 Id. § 2008.
71 See The Hague Invasion Act, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 24, 2001, at B6 (de-
scribing European fears of American aggression in defiance of international legal institu-
tions).
78 See 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act § 2008(c).
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Along with provisions for waivers of and exemptions from particular
provisions, ASPA also provides a general exemption, specifying that none of
its provisions should act to prohibit the United States from participating
in any way in international efforts to bring foreign nationals accused of
genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity to justice.79 The section
providing this exemption expressly refers to Saddam Hussein, Slobodon
Milosevic, Osama bin Laden, other members of Al Qaeda, and leaders of
Islamic Jihad as such foreign nationals.8 0
Now that ASPA has passed into law, the ability of the United States
to coerce other countries into Article 98 agreements, and thereby partially
insulate itself from the Court's jurisdiction, increases significantly."' The
Act allows the United States to threaten to withhold military assistance
from ICC state parties,8 2 giving American officials a new statutory tool to
wield in their efforts to exempt their country from the Court's reach. 3
Although ASPA limits the countries from which the United States can
withhold military aid, 4 its passage still served as a warning to much of the
international community since American military aid, in the form of edu-
cation, training, and monetary aid, is sent to a wide range of countries.8 5
Much of the domestic support for ASPA grows out of general oppo-
sition to the ICC.8 6 In the text of the Act itself, President Clinton's United
States Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, David Scheffer, is
quoted as describing the Rome Statute as leaving the United States "with
consequences that do not serve the cause of international justice."87 Leg-
islators such as Senator Helms have referred to the ICC as an "'interna-
791d. § 2015.80 Id.
11 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. For more on the United States exercising
this ability, see infra notes 136-138 and accompanying text.
82 See 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act § 2007. See also supra text accompany-
ing notes 71-75.
'3 See Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Ties Military Aid to Peacekeepers'lmmunity, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 10, 2002, at Al (reporting United States threats to withhold military aid from coun-
tries that do not agree to shield United States peacekeepers from the ICC).
4 See supra text accompanying notes 71-75.
85 See supra note 72.
1
6 See, e.g., John R. Bolton, Unsign That Treaty, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2001, at A21 (re-
sponding to President Clinton's signing of the Rome Statute). John R. Bolton is now the
Bush Administration's Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Secu-
rity. American opposition to the ICC was succinctly explained by Marc Grossman, United
States Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, in the notice that the Bush Administra-
tion sent to the U.N. regarding its intention not to make the United States a state party. See
Contemporary Practice, supra note 57, at 724. The notice gave several arguments against
joining the ICC: "(1) it undermined the role of the U.N. Security Council in maintaining
international peace and security; (2) it created a prosecutorial system that is an unchecked
power; (3) it purports to assert jurisdiction over nationals of states that have not ratified the
treaty; and (4) it is therefore built on a 'flawed foundation."' Id.
87 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act § 2002.
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tional kangaroo court,"'88 and New York Times columnist William Satire
dubbed it a "globocourt. ' 9
One of the primary concerns driving American opposition to the ICC
is the fear that the Rome Statute will lead to Americans being brought
before the Court, despite American non-participation in the institution.9"
Given that the ICC's jurisdiction is not limited to any specific set of indi-
viduals, however, the ICC could also exercise jurisdiction over American
civilians abroad.9' This general concern about Americans being prose-
cuted before the ICC is based on a belief that the Court will pursue po-
litically motivated prosecutions and treat citizens of a global superpower
differently than other suspects due to the political motives of parties to
the Court. 92 Opponents of the Court argue that the Prosecutor can easily
act on such motivations because of his or her ability to initiate investiga-
tions independently. 93
As reflected in the references within the Act to protecting "senior
officials of the United States government,"94 ASPA supporters particu-
larly fear that high-ranking government officials could be brought before
the ICC. Threatened legal actions against former Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger regarding his involvement in the 1973 Chilean coup that led to
Augusto Pinochet's rise to power have helped to highlight this concern.95
11 Amann & Sellers, supra note 51, at 385.
89 William Satire, Enter the Globocourt, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2002, at A25.
90 See 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act § 2002(8) ("Members of the Armed
Forces of the United States should be free from the risk of prosecution by the International
Criminal Court."). This concern applies most directly to American soldiers abroad, either
in combat or conducting a peace-keeping mission. See Press Release, Office of the House
Majority Whip, DeLay Calls ICC "Threat to America's Soldiers and Leaders"; Those Who
Protect Us Deserve Protection (May 14, 2002) [hereinafter DeLay Threat Press Release]
("Under the ICC, our soldiers fighting in terrible conditions at far corners of the globe will
now be at a risk of politically motivated prosecutions and imprisonment by a rogue
court."), available at http://www.tomdelay.com/html/prelease.cfm?releaseid=244.
91 See Lisa L. Turner & Lynn G. Norton, Civilians at the Tip of the Spear, 51 A.F. L.
REV. 1, 24-33 (2001) (foreseeing the prosecution of non-combatant civilian employees
working alongside the military). Commentators have also voiced concern regarding former
military combatants later being brought under the ICC's jurisdiction when traveling abroad
as civilians. See Guillory, supra note 49, at 132.
92 See Amann & Sellers, supra note 51, at 389 ("Opponents have maintained that be-
cause a majority of the Assembly of States Parties will select and may fire the prosecutor,
the character and motivations of the prosecutor will reflect the character and motivations of
a majority of states parties.").
93 See Rome Statute, supra note I, arts. 13(c), 15 (granting Prosecutor authority to
conduct investigations proprio motu).
94 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act § 2002(9). The Rome Statute makes explicit
provisions for trying both members of government and civilians as individuals with crimi-
nal responsibility, which highlights the recent move away from head of state immunity. See
Rome Statute, supra note I, art. 27 ("This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without
any distinction based on official capacity."). For a discussion of the shift away from head
of state immunity, see Gilbert Sison, Recent Development, A King No More: The Impact of
the Pinochet Decision on the Doctrine of Head of State Immunity, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1583
(2000).
95 See generally CHRISTOPHER HITCHENs, TRIAL OF HENRY KISSINGER (2001) (detail-
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The text of the Rome Statute, however, reveals many of these fears
to be unfounded. First, it is unlikely that any United States personnel
would be subject to politically motivated prosecutions given the limited
types of crimes covered by the Statute.96 Second, the principle of com-
plementarity protects against the specter of politically motivated prose-
cutions.97 Since a case will only come before the ICC if the national courts
of the defendant are unwilling or unable to prosecute it, an American
would only be brought before the ICC if not tried by American prosecu-
tors before an American court. Thus, the ICC can be seen as a default
jurisdiction, taking cases only when other possible courts have refused
them. 98 Third, the Rome Statute requires that biased judges be excused99
and restricts the Prosecutor's ability to initiate investigations. 0' The Prose-
cutor has no independent power to begin an investigation or legal proc-
ess °1 and can be barred from continuing with an investigation or prose-
cution throughout the process. 02 Since the ICC Prosecutor arguably has
less authority than a United States district attorney or county prosecutor,'013
the claim that the ICC will pursue politically motivated prosecutions ap-
pears quite weak.
A further concern of ASPA supporters focuses on specific provisions
of the Rome Statute that the American government finds particularly of-
fensive. First on this list is the lack of rights provided to defendants be-
fore the Court. Members of Congress and other public officials who op-
pose the Court have repeatedly voiced their fears of Americans being denied
a jury trial, the right to cross-examine witnesses, and protection from
ing the crimes against humanity with which Kissinger could potentially be charged were
universal jurisdiction asserted over his official acts); Michael J. Kelly, Kissinger's World: A
Cautionary Tale Through a Cold War Lens, 3 SAN DIEGO INT'L. L.J. 133, 142-43 (2002)
(stating that Kissinger has been served with orders to appear in courts in France, Argen-
tina, and Chile to testify regarding his involvement in such crimes).
96 See supra text accompanying note 25 (describing the four crimes over which the
ICC exercises jurisdiction). See also John Seguin, Note, Denouncing the International
Criminal Court: An Examination of U.S. Objections to the Rome Statute, 18 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 85, 101-02 (quoting a member of the United States delegation to the Rome Confer-
ence as saying that "politically motivated international prosecutions ... of U.S. military
personnel would be quite improbable").
97 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. The principle of complementarity was
first implemented at the Nuremberg tribunal. Wexler, supra note 12, at 249. Since the Nur-
emberg tribunal only tried major war criminals, minor offenders were tried where their
crimes had occurred. Id.
98 See id. at 250.
99 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 41. Judges can either be excused at their own or
the Prosecutor's request or disqualified from a case if their "impartiality might reasonably
be doubted on any ground." Id.
10°See supra note 27 (describing limits on investigations proprio motu). See also
Leigh, supra note 39, at 129-30; Amann & Sellers, supra note 51, at 389 (emphasizing
limits on Prosecutor's independence).
101 See supra note 27.
102 See supra note 27.
103 Leigh, supra note 39, at 128.
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self-incrimination."° As Senator Robert F. Bennett (R-Utah) stated, one
common reaction to the ICC is a fear of Americans losing "any rights [they]
currently have under the U.S. Constitution."''05
Despite these claims, however, the ICC protects many rights equivalent
to those found in the federal Constitution, with the Rome Statute deline-
ating a list of rights more detailed than that in the American Bill of
Rights.0 6 Moreover, while ASPA supporters are correct that the ICC does
not provide for trial by jury, Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights would not
be permitted under the American military justice system in any case.'0 7
A further weakness envisioned by opponents of the ICC is the Court's
lack of accountability to individual nations. American opponents of the
Court fear that the power of the United States on the world stage will not
be enough to sway this "unaccountable new international legal bureauc-
racy,"'0 8 making strong countermeasures such as ASPA necessary to tame
this uncontrollable new entity. Not only are judges nominated from dif-
ferent member states,0 9 but the United States will not be able to veto
whatever decision these international judges hand down."0
0o4 See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the House Majority Whip, DeLay Amendment to
Protect American Service Members Passes Overwhelmingly (May 10, 2001) [hereinafter
DeLay Amendment Press Release] (on file with author). According to Representative De-
Lay, "[Americans] could be denied a jury trial. They could be denied cross-examination of
hostile witnesses. Americans could even be forced to give self-incriminating testimony."
Id.
105 148 CONG. REC. S7847 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2002) (statement of Sen. Bennett). This
rights-based argument is closely tied to the fear of politically motivated prosecutions. Al-
though all constitutional rights may not be provided for Americans currently tried over-
seas, ICC opponents fear that Americans whose rights were not protected would be par-
ticularly susceptible to differential treatment before the ICC. See DeLay Amendment Press
Release, supra note 104. For further discussion of the underlying concern about politically
motivated prosecutions, see supra text accompanying notes 96-97.
l06 See supra note 39. Legal scholars have argued that these rights are "in general very
similar to, and to some extent can be traced back to, those required by the U.S. Constitu-
tion, and arguably are even somewhat superior to those." Paul C. Szasz, The United States
Should Join the International Criminal Court, 9 USAFA J. LEG. STUD. 1, 15 (1998-99).
"01 See Leigh, supra note 39, at 130 ("Trial by jury ... is not available to service mem-
bers under the Fifth Amendment. They are excepted from coverage by the test of the Fifth
Amendment. And the same exception is generally assumed to be applicable under the
Sixth Amendment."). See also United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 18 (1955)
(upholding distinction between military tribunals and civilian courts and guaranteeing jury
trials only for the latter). This rebuttal does not, however, address the concerns of civilians
being deprived of a jury trial by the Court. See supra notes 91, 94-95 and accompanying
text.
108 DeLay Threat Press Release, supra note 90.
109 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 36(4)(b) ("Each State Party may put forward
one candidate for any given election who need not necessarily be a national of that State
Party but shall in any case be a national of a State Party.").
"'See Turner, supra note 91, at 33 (noting that the United States will not have the
power to veto the rulings of the ICC, as it can do with decisions made by the U.N. Security
Council). This argument is again closely tied to the fear of America having no remedy if
its citizens are targeted by the Court.
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This argument, however, supports the United States joining the ICC.
Since the Rome Statute permits each state party to nominate a judge,"'
one way for the United States to render the court more accountable would be
to ratify the Rome Statute and nominate its own judge. In addition, were the
United States a party to the ICC, it would become party to the Assembly
of States Parties, thereby acquiring a voice in shaping the Court more to
its liking."' By not ratifying the Rome Statute, the United States may be
missing an important opportunity to influence the development of the
ICC in its formative stages.
A further line of criticism of the ICC is that the Statute of Rome is
not compatible with international law. As legal scholars have pointed out,
combining international law and criminal law is still a fairly new task." 3
The strongest argument against the international legal aspect of the stat-
ute is that a treaty should be binding on its parties only."4 Since the ju-
risdiction of the ICC extends to citizens of states that are not members of
the court,"5 members of the United States government have argued that
the entire statute is unlawful." 6
This claim is debatable, however. While international law may pre-
vent a treaty from having jurisdiction over a non-party state, this prohi-
bition does not extend to citizens of that non-party state who are charged
with committing an offense within the territory of a party to the treaty." 7
1I See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 36(4)(b).
2 See Leigh, supra note 39, at 124-25 (arguing that United States' non-participation
in the ICC means it "will not become a member of the Assembly of States Parties and thus
will not participate in shaping the court in its early formative years"); Overwrought on the
Criminal Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2002, at A18 (advocating United States involvement
in the Court).
I See Louise Arbour, J., Access to Justice: The Prosecution of International Crimes:
Prospects and Pitfalls, I WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 13, 17 (1999) (arguing that it is of "criti-
cal importance that we define appropriately the role of international criminal justice, that
we fully empower the courts to do what they are designed to do, and that we resist the
temptation to use them as inadequate substitutes for the many other ways in which civil
societies must be reconsidered after war and sustained in their search for peace"). Justice
Arbour, who sits on the Ontario Court of Appeals, was appointed the Chief Prosecutor for
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for Rwanda by the U.N. Security Council in 1996. Id. at 13 nal.
H4 See Scheffer, supra note 26 (arguing that the Rome Statute "runs counter to some
serious norms of international law if it purports to empower the Court to exercise jurisdic-
tion over non-party nationals").
M5 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 12 (granting jurisdiction to the Court if either
the state of which the accused is a national or the state in which the conduct occurred is a
party to the ICC).16 See U.S. Department of Defense, Background Briefing on the International Crimi-
nal Court (July 2, 2002) (arguing that the Rome Statute "claims to apply even to countries
that are not parties" and deeming that this is "a deviation from hundreds of years of inter-
national legal practice"), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Ju12002/t07022002_
t07O2icc.html.
117 See Leigh, supra note 39, at 127. According to one commentator, under customary
international law,
the national who commits an offense within the territory of any state is subject to
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Under territorial jurisdiction, American citizens can currently be tried in
the court of a country in whose territory an alleged crime occurred." 8 While
being sent to an international court for trial differs from being tried in the
country in which an alleged offense was committed, this difference does
not appear to render the ICC's jurisdiction invalid." 9 In fact, some legal
scholars have suggested that the jurisdiction of the ICC, far from violat-
ing customary international law, is more advantageous to suspects than
traditional territorial jurisdiction. 20 A court that is accountable to multi-
ple countries and whose laws and administration are the result of multi-
lateral negotiations would appear better situated to protect suspects' in-
terests than would a national court.
Other legal concerns about the ICC focus on the crimes over which
the Rome Statute authorizes the Court to exercise jurisdiction. 2' Critics
have attacked the Statute for redefining genocide, crimes against human-
ity, and war crimes, whose definitions had been well-established in pre-
vious treaties, and for including the crime of aggression without defining
it.'22 As the Statute cannot be amended to define the crime of aggression
that state's territorial jurisdiction-and would be so subject if there were no treaty
at all. No rule of customary international law prohibits the territorial sovereign
from exercising its jurisdiction directly over the offender, even if acting under the
direction of a nonparty state; nor from extraditing the offender to another coun-
try-even to a country of which the accused is not a national.
Id.
]I See Research in International Law of the Harvard Law School, Draft Convention on
Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L. L. 435, 445 (1935). The first of five
general principles of jurisdiction is "the territorial principle, [which] determin[es] juris-
diction by reference to the place where the offence is committed, [and] is everywhere re-
garded as of primary importance and of fundamental character." Id.
"9 It is difficult to see how such jurisdiction could be invalid when even the broader
principle of universal jurisdiction, based on the belief that certain crimes are so universally
condemned that all states have a jurisdictional interest in them, is gaining more support in
the international community. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF INT'L L. § 402 (permitting
universal jurisdiction over genocide and war crimes, among others). In fact, the United
States itself has taken tentative steps toward accepting universal jurisdiction in certain
areas. See Torture Convention Implementation Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-236, § 506(a), 108
Stat. 382, 463 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (1994)) (establishing jurisdiction over torture
beyond United States borders if "(I) the alleged offender is a national of the United States,
or (2) the alleged offender is present in the United States, regardless of the nationality of
the victim or alleged offender").
'120 See Leigh, supra note 39, at 127 (positing that an offender extradited from an ICC
state party to the court by the territorial sovereign "might receive a fairer trial than in the
courts of the country where the offense was committed").
121 See supra text accompanying note 25.
122 See, e.g., Malvina Halberstam, Panel Discussion: Association of American Law
Schools Panel on the International Criminal Court, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 223, 233 (1999)
(criticizing the definitions of Article 5 crimes). Given concerns about including the crime
of aggression at all in the Rome Statute, the United States and others arranged a compro-
mise at Rome such that aggression would be included as one of the Article Five core
crimes, but would not be defined for seven years following ratification. See generally Ben-
jamin B. Ferencz, Getting Aggressive About Preventing Aggression, 6 BROWN J. WORLD
AFF. 87 (1999).
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for seven more years, 123 the possibility still exists that this crime could be
defined in opposition to the will of the United States. 124 Supporters of the
ICC, however, argue that the crime of aggression, with its historical
foundations in the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, is suffi-
ciently important in an international criminal court to remain in the Rome
Statute and, they hope, to be defined at the end of seven years.'25 Given that
the Court can now only prosecute war crimes, genocide, and crimes
against humanity, and that the principle of complementarity permits
prosecutions only after no court in the defendant's state of nationality has
exercised jurisdiction, many of the ICC abuses predicted by ASPA pro-
ponents, from asserting jurisdiction over Americans for purely political
reasons to depriving Americans of their rights under both United States
and international law, 2 6 seem effectively impossible.
Whereas supporters of ASPA focus on the negative elements of the
ICC, opponents point to the positive aspects of the Court, as embodied in
the goals laid out in the preamble to the Rome Statute, to question whether
these supposed negatives truly justify ASPA.'27 The ICC is not only
significant for what it will do in the future; the Court's mere existence
has been celebrated as historically significant. 18 The Rome Statute itself
establishes the ICC "for the sake of present and future generations,' 29 and
observers have lauded the Court as a representation of a new step forward
in international law. 3° Supporters of the ICC applaud its focus on indi-
vidual responsibility, 3 ' which, in the words of one legal scholar, "would
make it possible to bring to justice those who engage in the most heinous
crimes-genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and terrorism-
even if the perpetrator is a national of a state that condones, encourages,
23 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
124 See Ferencz, supra note 122, at 92. The United States State Department argued that
"with respect to individual culpability the crime of aggression should be excluded [from
the Rome Statute] at this stage." Id.
125 See id. (stating that the American prosecutors at Nuremberg "considered ... the
most important achievement of the Nuremberg trials [to be] the outlawry of aggressive
war").
'26 See supra text accompanying notes 85-124.
127 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl. The Rome Statute's preamble "[affirms] that
the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go
unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the
national level and by enhancing international cooperation," and "[resolves] to guarantee
lasting respect for and the enforcement of international justice." Id.
128 See, e.g., U.N., Secretary-General Says Establishment of International Criminal
Court is Gift of Hope to Future Generations, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/6643/L/2891 (1998) (quoting
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan calling the Rome Statute "a gift of hope to future gen-
erations"), cited in Arbour, supra note 113, at 17 n. 13.
129 Id.
130 See Szasz, supra note 106, at 24 (arguing that the ICC "represents a major step in
advancing international law, in particular international humanitarian law, in helping to
implement laws and principles that the United States has always stood for").
31 See supra notes 12, 94.
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or supports the conduct."' With the United States standing alone amongst
its traditional allies in not signing the Rome Statute, one rationale for the
United States becoming a party to the Court is that its underlying princi-
ple of international justice deserves strong international support.'33
A further argument contesting ASPA focuses not on the ICC but rather
on the coercive elements of the Act itself, which many opponents deem
unnecessarily harsh. Some commentators have charged that ASPA is an-
other element in a recent trend toward unilateralism and non-coopera-tion
by the United States government.'34 Other commentators challenge specific
provisions of the Act, particularly those prohibiting military aid or per-
mitting the President to use any means necessary to retrieve Americans
brought before the Court.'35
The coercive nature of ASPA can best be seen in its use immediately
after its passage. In the late summer of 2002, America used the threat of
ASPA to encourage other nations to join it in bilateral Article 98 agree-
ments, under which nations would not be permitted to extradite United
States citizens to the ICC.'136 Article 98 agreements thus allow the United
States to oppose the Court while still falling within the letter of the Rome
Statute.'37 By mid-August, Romania and Israel had signed such agreements,
and the Bush Administration was pushing for additional signatories.'
132 Halberstam, supra note 122, at 232-33. As U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan
stated, the entry into force of the Rome Statute marked "'a great victory for justice and for
world order ... [and] a turn away from the rule of brute force, and towards the rule of
law."' European Parliament Resolution on the Draft American Servicemembers' Protection
Act (ASPA), EUR. PARL. Doc. P5 TA-PROV 1367 (2002) [hereinafter European Parliament
Resolution]. The ICC is "the first permanent body with international jurisdiction able to
judge individuals ... responsible for war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity."
Id.
.133 See Blakesley, supra note 40, at 237-38 (referring to the Rome Conference as "an
opportunity to do something right-to create a tribunal that is fair and just," and arguing
that "[m]aybe there still is a chance to do so").
134 See, e.g., James Carroll, US Should Back Tribunal, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 12, 2000,
at A23; European Parliament Resolution, supra note 132, at § 5 (calling "on the US Con-
gress to reject the unilateralism which the ASPA represents, and to embrace in deeds as
well as rhetoric the reality that only the common endeavour of the international community
will bring to justice tyrants and perpetrators of genocide or other crimes against humanity,
including terrorists"). Bush Administration officials such as Secretary of State Colin Pow-
ell, however, have rejected this accusation of unilateralism as overly simplistic. See Colin
L. Powell, Threats and Responses: Perspectives, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2002, § 1, at 26.
135 See European Parliament Resolution, supra note 132, at § 4 (noting that ASPA "ex-
plicitly denies the US itself ... military and intelligence cooperation" and referring to a
resolution adopted by the Netherlands on June 13, 2002 "expressing its concern over
ASPA, which would give the US President the right to authorise [sic] the use of force
against the Netherlands to free members of the US armed forces, civilians and allies held
captive by the ICC"). European opponents fear that ASPA could lead to the United States
using force to free an American citizen from the Court. See Joshua Rozenberg, Will Bush
Invade Cambridgeshire?, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Sept. 5, 2002, at 23.
136See supra note 38 and accompanying text. Christopher Marquis, U.S. Is Seeking
Pledges to Shield Its Peacekeepers From Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2002, at Al.
137 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
M3 See Marquis, supra note 136, at Al.
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In response to these American threats, the international community
immediately charged the Bush Administration with heavy-handedness 3 9
The EU warned its thirteen candidate countries 40 against signing coerced
Article 98 agreements, charging that the agreements were inconsistent with
international law and unnecessary for the countries signing them. 41 On
August 13, 2002, Switzerland went further, announcing its refusal to sign
any exemption agreement. 42 Other critics argued that these agreements
were a misuse of Article 98.'4' The angry response sparked by its initial
use bodes poorly for ASPA as a positive addition to the tools available to
American diplomats.
The various arguments against the ICC do not justify the extremity
of ASPA.'" As shown by the international outrage that met the coercive
use of ASPA, the ICC is a priority to many of the United States' allies.'45
' See Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Presses for Total Exemption from War Crimes Court,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2002, at A6 (citing the frustration of European and Canadian officials
at United States use of ASPA).
140 These thirteen candidate countries, which are vying for accession to the EU in the
future, are Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Turkey. See E.U., EUROPEAN UNION AT A GLANCE,
at http://europa.eu.int/abc-en.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2003) (listing the candidate coun-
tries).
" See Press Release, Coalition for the International Criminal Court, EU Council Ap-
proves Common Position Rejecting US Bilateral Agreements (Sept. 30, 2002), available at
http://www.iccnow.org/pressroom/ciccmediastatements/2002/09.30.02EUAdoptsCP.pdf.
142 See Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Issues Warning to Europeans in Dispute Over New
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2002, at AI0. There were also charges that the United States
had threatened the candidacy of prospective NATO countries who refused to sign such
agreements, but this charge has been contested by the United States. See id.
143 See Becker, supra note 142, at A6 (reporting the criticisms of senior Canadian and
European officials); Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Issues Warning to Europeans in Dispute Over
New Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2002, at AI0. In mid-October, the EU and the United
States reached a compromise on the Article 98 agreements. See Becker, supra note 142, at
A6. The EU granted permission to individual member states to sign bilateral agreements
with the United States, but these agreements could exempt only American military person-
nel and diplomats from prosecution. See Becker, supra note 142, at A6. Following this
allowance-which acted as an effective international acknowledgment, if not outright ap-
proval, of the Article 98 agreements-close to twenty countries have signed exemption
agreements with the United States. Sanjay Suri, Rights: A Brave New Court with Little
Real Power, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Mar. 12, 2003, LEXIS, Nexis Library, INPRES File.
'44 One further argument against the ICC not addressed here-or in much of the lit-
erature or debates surrounding the Court-is that perhaps the whole idea of a permanent
international tribunal is misguided. As suggested in Hannah Arendt's study of trial of
Adolf Eichmann after World War 11, one danger of such a court is that it could perhaps
excuse political responsibility by effectively transforming the few prosecuted individuals
into scapegoats for the many who may have been involved in an offense. See generally
HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL (Pen-
guin Books, 1976) (1964).
'45 See Letter from Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary-General, to Colin Powell, U.S. Secretary
of State (July 3, 2002), available at http://www.igc.org/icc/html/SGlettertoSC3July2002.
pdf. According to Secretary- General Annan,
the establishment of the ICC is considered by many, including [America's] closest
allies, as a major achievement in our efforts to address the impunity that is also a
major concern for the United States .... I fear that the reactions against any at-
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Passed almost one year after September 11, 2001, ASPA exists in an in-
ternational context in which the support of other countries is recognized
as a necessary element in the war against terrorism,'4 6 yet the Act itself
contradicts the goal of establishing allied support. By drafting a bill de-
signed not only to oppose the ICC but to actively thwart it, America seems
to be going in the exact opposite direction and alienating its allies just
when it claims to need them most.'47
From an analysis of the Rome Statute and the diplomacy surrounding
the ICC and ASPA, it does not seem that the arguments against the ICC
warrant blocking the Court as vehemently as the American government
has done in passing ASPA. Instead, given American negotiating power,
the United States should keep open the possibility of changing the ICC
from within-or at least not bar this possibility entirely.'48 In becoming a
party to the Court, the United States could have a say in, among other
things, nominating judges, defining the crime of aggression, and determin-
ing which crimes are prosecuted. Although the United States has now
missed the opportunity to be involved in the first round of judicial ap-
pointments and administrative decisions affecting the Court, it could still
address many of its concerns as a party to the court rather than as the
Court's strongest opponent. Such involvement better protects United
States interests than does ASPA.
As the EU has highlighted, ASPA acts in opposition to American
interests in that the United States is directly hindering its war against
terrorism by "explicitly den[ying] itself two of the principal weapons-
military and intelligence cooperation-of the global coalition against ter-
rorism."'49 Whereas military aid has traditionally been believed to be in
America's interest, ASPA views it as a mere gratuity that can be revoked
at will. Under ASPA, the education, training, and monetary aid that the
United States provides is no longer seen as creating a more stable inter-
tempts at, as they perceive it, undermining the Rome Statute will be very strong.
Id. See also European Parliament Resolution, supra note 132.
146 See Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response
to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1347 (Sept. 20,
2001) (requesting "the help of police forces, intelligence services, and banking systems
around the world").
1"7 See European Parliament Resolution, supra note 132, § 2 (arguing that "ASPA goes
well beyond the exercise of the US's sovereign right not to participate in the Court, since it
contains provisions which could obstruct and undermine the Court and threatens to penal-
ise [sic] countries which have chosen to support the Court").
48 Before ASPA was passed, Senator Christopher J. Dodd (D-Conn.) proposed a bill
that exemplified such an approach. See American Citizens' Protection and War Criminal
Prosecution Act of 2001, S. 1296, 107th Cong. (2001). Instead of advocating immediate
ratification of the Rome Statute or barring all future involvement with the Court, this bill
encouraged the United States to remain involved in setting up the ICC and foresaw the
Senate ratifying the Rome Statute only after the Court had established a strong track rec-
ord. See id.
'49 European Parliament Resolution, supra note 132, at § 4.
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national community and thus providing greater safety for America itself.
Instead, military aid is now viewed as something from which only other
countries gain. 5° While ASPA permits the President to waive its ban on
military aid to ICC members when such assistance is in the national in-
terest, '5 this approach presumes that much of the military aid now pro-
vided by the United States would not fall under such a waiver provision.
With the passage of ASPA and the implication that threatening to with-
hold such aid is in America's interests, the United States views its na-
tional interests as being such that opposition to the ICC outweighs all
other security and diplomacy concerns. Given the current international
climate and the minimal dangers currently posed by the ICC, this seems
unlikely.
ASPA may have responded to many of the criticisms of the ICC within
the United States, but its use after August 2, 2002 has led to international
outcry. In the current international situation, where America's interests
are not well-served by antagonizing potential allies and withholding
military aid, such a coercive tool appears not only unnecessary but po-
tentially harmful.
-Lilian V Faulhaber
150 See 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from and Re-
sponse to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-206, § 2007, 116 Stat.
820, 905 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7426) (prohibiting the United States from providing
military aid to parties to the ICC).
151 See id. § 2007(b).
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